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February 3, 2003 
At a time when the talk of war against Iraq is so casually bandied about in the United States, Elliot 
A. Cohen's book, Supreme Command, is timely and essential reading for supporters and 
opponents of that war. Cohen studies four great statesmen—Abraham Lincoln, Georges 
Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben Gurion. One of his major conclusions is that they 
succeeded in their role because they immersed themselves in the conduct of war; they mastered 
their military briefs as thoroughly as they did their civilian ones; and they demanded and expected 
from their military subordinates a candor as bruising as it was necessary. While the study of those 
leaders is significant for the current and future generations of leaders, it is equally important to 
examine how President George W. Bush conducts himself in the seemingly definite war against 
Iraq. He has the benefit of Cohen's sage observations, since he is reported to have read 
Supreme Command. 
If Cohen's book establishes one thing, it is that the top civilian leadership must be highly 
proactive, and remain wholly involved in every step of a military operation, quizzing the military 
leaders about the nature and scope of actions taken. All four great statesmen of his study did just 
that, and did it exceedingly well. The author consistently and persuasively rejects what he calls 
the "normal" theory of civil-military relations, which states that after making decision to take 
military actions—a sole prerogative of civilian leadership—the latter should let the military run the 
campaign, which is supposedly the forte of military leaders. None of the statesmen studied in 
Cohen's book lived by the "normal" theory of civil-military relations. "All of them drove their 
generals to distraction, eliciting a curious mixture of rage and affection as they did so." 
In the most important chapter of his study, "Leadership Without Genius," Cohen raises an 
interesting point about President Lyndon B. Johnson and his conduct of the Vietnam War. He 
notes, "Johnson and [his secretary of defense Robert] McNamara operated from a false strategic 
concept—a 'theory of victory' that rested on radically inadequate understanding of the opponents 
and, for that matter, of their own society." The author faults the civilian leadership for failing to ask 
hard questions to military leaders about the basic direction of the war, about its related "strategic 
choices;" and the military brass for remaining equally unclear about how to attain victory. 
Elaborating on the role of Johnson's military advisers, Cohen writes, "That they supported the war 
we know. That they favored waging it more aggressively we also know. But one searches in vain 
for evidence they had any strategic concept other than more intense bombing or the dispatch of 
even more men to the fighting front."  
Seeking Strategic Purpose in Iraq 
Applying the preceding to the Iraqi situation Bush currently faces, the need for having a clear 
strategic concept—I prefer the phrase "strategic purpose"—is vital. We do not know what 
President Bush has learned from Cohen's book, and what lessons he has drawn from it for his 
upcoming involvement in a military campaign against Iraq. However, if Cohen's observation about 
the significance of having a right strategic purpose is correct, then military action against Iraq 
should never take place.  
The litmus test of a right strategic purpose is the answer the question, what does the United 
States want to achieve by taking military action against Iraq? Is the strategic purpose of such a 
campaign for the United States to become a "puppeteer" of Iraq and a controller of its vast oil 
reserves, as is generally believed in the Middle East? Undoubtedly, no U.S. official will answer 
affirmatively to that question. Is the strategic objective of the United States to disarm Iraq? If so, 
then the issue of a military campaign is obviated, unless Saddam categorically rejects any U.N. 
inspections. But the issue has not even reached that stage yet. However, reading the daily press 
coverage, and watching President Bush's regular public discussions of Iraq, there is little doubt 
that the decision to invade that country has been made, and only its timing remains in question. 
As things stand now, however, the Bush administration appears unable to effectively answer such 
basic questions as, why attack Iraq now? What crucial information has the United States acquired 
about Saddam's dictatorship that supports the conclusion that he must be ousted in the near 
future? 
Absent articulation of a clear strategic purpose, we are still left with an unambiguous need for 
having one. One frequent suggestion is that Iraq will be a good test case of a new U.S. strategic 
concept—mentioned in Bush's National Security Strategy of September 2002— that the Muslim 
world should be introduced to democracy, and only the United States is qualified to do that. In an 
essay on the "grand strategy" of the United States under Bush, Johns Lewis Gaddis speculates 
about the current Administration's "grand" purpose as follows: "What appears at first glance to be 
a lack of clarity about who's deterrable and who's not turns out, upon closer examination, to be a 
plan for transforming the entire Muslim Middle East: for bringing it, once and for all, into the 
modern world."[1]  
If there is, indeed, a U.S. grand strategy to democratize the Muslim world, there is little doubt that 
the timing of it is horrible, and the methodology potentially disastrous. 
It takes little knowledge of current affairs of the Muslim world, and not very much imagination, to 
conclude that anti-Americanism in those countries is at an all time high. No Arab state at the 
present time wishes to be perceived as friendly to any U.S. aspirations regarding Iraq. In fact, the 
Bush administration's handling of the PLO-Israeli conflict has fostered deep Muslim hostility 
toward Washington. Even after the tragic explosion in Bali, the government of President 
Magawati Sukarnoputri has not cracked down on Islamists to the degree sought by the United 
States. There have been attacks on U.S. Marines in Kuwait, which owes its current independence 
to the American-led Gulf War of 1991. A U.S. diplomat was murdered in Jordan. The government 
of Egypt, one of the closest Arab allies of the United States, seems to be pandering to anti-Israeli 
sentiments by showing the 41-part film Horseman Without a Horse across the Arab world, despite 
American and Israeli requests that the film be banned as anti-Semitic. 
There are suggestions in some quarters that the best the United States can hope to accomplish 
after conquering Iraq is to occupy it and utilize the Japanese and German occupation models of 
transforming it into a democracy. Those who point to these models fail to recall that both those 
nations were parties to a world war. Iraq, on the contrary, is not party to a conflict of that 
magnitude against the United States. It has neither attacked the United States, nor does it aspire 
to. More to the point, Iraq is not a Buddhist Japan or a Christian Germany whose socio-religious 
milieus were not hostile to the United States. Occupation of a Muslim country by the United 
States during an era when the contentious rhetoric of Osama bin Laden is constantly depicting it 
as an "infidel" power is only an invitation for daily disasters as long the American troops continue 
to occupy Iraq.  
The Need for Supreme Command  
An accurate reading of Cohen's book underscores the importance of having a correct strategy 
before the United States invades Iraq. But if my reading of the public debate on this issue is 
correct, that strategy is evolving on a daily basis. There is no empirical evidence available 
indicating that a regular—more important, rigorous—examination of that strategy is being done. 
Only President Bush is well placed to ask the right type of questions to his subordinates; only he 
ought to be asking: why should we invade Iraq? Why now, why at all? Is there any other way to 
dealing with the situation; is invasion likely to promote America's strategic objectives; how would 
it affect the United States' ongoing global war on terrorism, etc.? Watching the official debate 
from a distance, he seems to be very much a part of the hawkish rhetoric that is so pervasive 
within Washington official and semi-official circles. One only hopes that away from public scrutiny, 
he is asking his subordinates the aforementioned questions on a daily basis.  
The military leadership is off the hook in the contemporary era when the U.S. military dominance 
is awesome and unquestionable. The military operations against Iraq will be successful, as they 
were against the Taliban/al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan in 2001-2002. But the success of a 
strategic campaign is an entirely different story. The jury is still out on whether the United States 
has, indeed, won the overall war in Afghanistan. By the same token, it will be a long while after 
the conclusion of the military campaign before one may be able to state with certainty that the 
United States has, indeed, won in Iraq. When it comes to Saddam, the feeling of hatred of him is 
so pervasive and intense that rational analysis of the issue of toppling him may not be possible. 
Hawks and doves in the United States may be of one mind on the issue. However, considering 
what is at stake, one hopes that their hatred of the dictator of Iraq will not tilt them on the side of a 
wrong decision. The supreme commander of the United States armed forces will be ill served 
then.  
As long as one is thinking of Bush's role as a statesman in the context of the seemingly 
impending war in Iraq, a number of observations must be made. First, unlike the four great 
statesmen's awesome ordeals that are the topics of Cohen's analysis, the military portion of 
United States' war against Iraq is going to be minor. Second, the statesmen of Cohen's study 
could not avoid the wars of their era. War against Iraq, on the contrary, belongs to an entirely 
different category. It is highly avoidable, and, indeed, unnecessary. Third, the modalities of the 
performance of Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben Gurion in their respective wars—i.e., the 
fact that they kept their sights focused on their strategic objectives, and that they immersed 
themselves in the operational details of them while ensuring that their commanders continued to 
serve their overall purpose—made them great. The main challenge of Bush's statesmanship will 
depend on how he manages the nation-building phase of the military invasion of Iraq. On this 
issue, his record in Afghanistan leaves little room for optimism—especially when one considers 
that the post-war challenges in Iraq may dwarf those in Afghanistan. 
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